Postdoctoral Fellow, Philosophy, University of Toronto
matt.delhey@mail.utoronto.ca
I am a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Toronto, where I completed my dissertation, Hegel's Theory of Institutions: A Study of Sittlichkeit, in September 2024.
My research lies at the intersection of 19th-century philosophy (especially Hegel and German idealism) and social and political philosophy.
I am also interested in German idealism's contribution to new currents in social philosophy, such as social ontology, critical social theory, and the philosophy of technology and AI. My engagement with these issues is informed by my industry experience as a data scientist in the technology sector.
Historically, my work centers on Hobbes, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Marx, including their influence on social theory and the Frankfurt School.
Abstract: Hegel's commentators often attribute to his system some form of apriorism, the view that the system's content or its justification (or both) are independent of experience and empirical science. In this article, I argue that apriorism conflicts with Hegel's commitment to cooperation between the philosophical and empirical sciences, as outlined in §§1–18 of the 1830 Encyclopaedia. I do so by attributing two theses to Hegel: scientific cooperation—that knowledge arises through a process of conceptual transformation which requires an intellectual division of labour between the philosophical and empirical sciences; and incompatibility—that scientific cooperation entails a feedback loop between the philosophical and empirical sciences, rendering the concepts of Hegel's system empirically revisable, and so not a priori. Although these two theses hold across all the philosophical sciences, I focus on their application in logic, as it is in logic where apriorist interpretations appear the most justified. Reimagining a scientifically cooperative Hegel not only supports naturalist readings of his system but also reframes the task of philosophical critique. Critique, on the scientific-cooperative reading I propose, aims to exposit the insights, discoveries, and theories of the empirical sciences, furthering their ends by ameliorating their conceptual apparatus, not to debunk them.
Abstract: This article defends Hegel against Schelling's critique that his system can only comprehend actuality but cannot explain it. It does so while granting Schelling his basic premise, namely, that Hegel's system is entirely logical. Hegel's account of comprehension effectively answers Schelling's ‘despairing' question: why is there something rather than nothing? In the first part, I reconstruct Schelling's critique, showing that he takes Hegel's system to be entirely logical; as logical, a priori, and as a priori, unable to explain existence. In the second part, I advance a moderately deflationary reading of Hegel on which philosophy, as comprehending cognition, guarantees the non-vacuity of its categories by deriving them through conceptually transforming the universals of empirical science. Given its compellingness as a response to Schelling's critique, this moderately deflationary reading warrants further development as an interpretation of Hegel's thought.
Abstract: This article reevaluates Hölderlin's social and political thought in the 1790s. Against Georg Lukács, it argues that Hölderlin's politics of the new mythology, while utopian, are not mystical. In the Fragment of Philosophical Letters and the Oldest System-Programme of German Idealism, Hölderlin instead articulates two fundamental claims. Socially, the new mythical collectivity must elevate (erheben) the social relations produced by bourgeois society, exalting them in aesthetic-religious form, rather than sublating (aufheben) them, modifying both their form and their content. Politically, realizing this new collectivity requires transcending the state, and so is essentially revolutionary. Hölderlin's prosaic writings thus supplement Hyperion's romantic critique of modernity. They take as their point of departure a sober exposition of the social relations of the market emerging in Hölderlin's time and, from within these relations, excavate a new mythical collectivity capable of suturing the fragmentary divisions of modern life.
Hegel's institutionalization of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) into the spheres of the family, civil society, and the state is regarded as among his most important contributions to philosophy. In this study, I show that Hegel understands institutions to be rational social forms. Institutions, such as marriage, the corporation, and sovereignty, are concrete forms that order social life according to its immanent telos, the realization of human freedom.
For Hegel, I argue, institutions must be understood ontologically (Chapter 3) and normatively (Chapter 4). In doing so, he unifies the two institutional paradigms that precede him: the French institutional tradition, exemplified by Montesquieu and Rousseau, and the German one, represented by Gustav Hugo and Kant (Chapter 1). Hegel's use of the concept of institutions across his published writings is also examined (Chapter 2).
Ontologically, institutions are, for Hegel, meso-level social structures that combine a mode of being with a social function. For example, marriage is a social relation that functions to spiritually unite two spouses; the corporation is an association that functions to establish internal order and mutual respect among its members. Against the views of contemporary social ontologists, such as John Searle and Vincent Descombes, these forms have an existence that is ontologically objective, similar to other social phenomena like economic recessions and racism, because it does not depend on people's attitudes about the institution itself.
Normatively, Hegel combines institutionality, that institutions are transcendental conditions of human sociality, and institutional rationality, that institutions have as their telos the realization of human freedom. Challenging the prevailing readings of normativity in Hegel, I argue that Hegel distinguishes between two kinds of institutional critique. The first is scientific or philosophical critique, which has a limited scope and derives from the concept of the institution in question. The second is political critique, which is wider-sweeping and derives from one's membership in an ethical community, but is always open to contestation by other members, and so cannot achieve certainty. By distinguishing between these two forms of institutional critique, Hegel limits science to make room for politics.
Hegel's institutional theory should be compelling to us today, I conclude, because it accounts for the nature, necessity, and objectivity of institutions in human life and provides a normative foundation for social critique. Appreciating Hegel's theory will aid us in rethinking institutions and inspire new directions in social research.
My pedagogy centers on the practice of writing, which I support with regular, low-stakes writing assignments, scaffolded assignments, in-class writing exercises, and metacognitive reflections on writing practice. For more information, see the sample syllabi below.
International Hobbes Association, Eastern APA, New York, NY (1/2024)
International Hegel-Vereinigung, "The Self-Conception of Philosophy and its Relationship to the (Other) Sciences," Stuttgart, Germany (6/2023)
Association of Philosophy Students, University of Toronto, Scarborough (10/2022)
Association of Philosophy Students, University of Toronto, Scarborough (3/2022)
A collection of links that I have found helpful for thinking and writing about Hegel.
An event series I co-organized with colleagues in Cinema Studies, Comparative Literature, and Philosophy funded by the Jackman Humanities Institute's Program in the Arts. The series ran for two discontinuous years: Collectivity, Performance, Dialectics (2020–21) and The Labour of the Negative (2022–23).
A reading group started during the COVID-19 pandemic. We've read, inter alia, the Grundrisse, Volume 1, and Volume 2. From contemporary authors, we've read Black Marxism (Cedric Robinson), The Warehouse (Alessandro Delfanti), and Marx and Critical Theory (Emmanuel Renault), the latter two having joined the reading group for discussion of their work. We're currently reading Volume 3.